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Abstract
This paper outlines a methodological approach for design-
ing adaptive agents driving themselves near points of criti-
cality. Using a synthetic approach we construct a conceptual
model that, instead of specifying mechanistic requirements to
generate criticality, exploits the maintenance of an organiza-
tional structure capable of reproducing critical behavior. Our
approach exploits the well-known principle of universality,
which classifies critical phenomena inside a few universal-
ity classes of systems independently of their specific mech-
anisms or topologies. In particular, we implement an artifi-
cial embodied agent controlled by a neural network maintain-
ing a correlation structure randomly sampled from a lattice
Ising model at a critical point. We evaluate the agent in two
classical reinforcement learning scenarios: the Mountain Car
benchmark and the Acrobot double pendulum, finding that in
both cases the neural controller reaches a point of criticality,
which coincides with a transition point between two regimes
of the agent’s behaviour, maximizing the mutual information
between neurons and sensorimotor patterns. Finally, we dis-
cuss the possible applications of this synthetic approach to
the comprehension of deeper principles connected to the per-
vasive presence of criticality in biological and cognitive sys-
tems.
Introduction
Biological systems at a wide range of scales – from protein
families to brains – show signatures of criticality. These sys-
tems do not operate deep into one or other regime of activity
instead of they operate at or near critical points, poised at
transitions in their parameter space (Mora and Bialek, 2011).
In a nutshell, criticality refers to a distinctive set of proper-
ties found at the boundary separating regimes with different
dynamics: the transition between an ordered and a disor-
dered phase. Some of these properties include power-law di-
vergences of some quantities described by critical exponents
and fractal behaviour (Salinas, 2001). Signatures of critical-
ity have been detected in neural cultures (Schneidman et al.,
2006), immune receptor proteins (Mora et al., 2010), the
network of genes controlling morphogenesis in fly embryos
(Krotov et al., 2014) or lipid membranes (Honerkamp-Smith
et al., 2009). As well, indicators of critical behaviour have
been observed in the human brain (Chialvo, 2014) and cog-
nitive behavioural patterns (Van Orden et al., 2012). These
results hint at general theoretical principles underlying bio-
logical self-organization, compelling us to ask what type of
mechanisms are driving biological systems at a dauntingly
diverse range of levels of organization to operate near criti-
cal points of activity.
This question is largely unresolved. Firstly, because the
connection between experimental descriptive indicators of
criticality and models is often fragile (Wagenmakers et al.,
2012). On the other hand, models of criticality are generally
used at the level of analogy, based on specific mechanis-
tic requirements reproducing criticality in a set of particular
cases, providing a myriad of different models but often fail-
ing to capture explanations of a few more universal classes
and properties. During the last decade a new generation of
experiments has attempted to go beyond analogies generat-
ing models directly inferred from biological data (Mora and
Bialek, 2011). However, the difficulty of inferring general
principles from the specific modelled mechanisms is still
patent in these models.
In order to progress in the comprehension of critical phe-
nomena, there are some alternatives and suggestions that we
could explore with more emphasis. For example, we could
try to detect universal mechanisms able to generate critical
activity in a wide set of systems and contexts. This approach
– a kind of ‘Artificial Life route’ to self-organized criticality
– could promote the development of conceptual models ex-
plaining how organisms are driven towards criticality in an
abstract level, working as ‘proofs of concept’ (Barandiaran
and Chemero, 2009) and supporting existing and future ex-
perimental findings. Specifically, here we focus on the rela-
tion of criticality with organizational invariants of the model.
By this, we mean that instead of specifying specific mech-
anistic requirements to generate criticality, we explore the
possibility of generating criticality through the conservation
of certain invariants in the relations between the components
of the system (e.g. correlations between components), i.e.
imposing certain patterns in the system’s organization. This
organizational point of view, in contrast with focusing on
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intrinsic properties of the components of the system, is sup-
ported by the existence of well-known universality classes
that provide a unified expression for families of systems op-
erating under criticality (Kadanoff, 2009). Systems under
the same universality class, even if they are defined by very
different material parameters or physical properties, present
the same critical exponents characterizing diverging observ-
ables which are defined by the symmetries of the system.
In line with these ideas, the paper is structured as follows.
First, we propose a conceptual model based on statistical
mechanics to design an artificial agent that maintains or-
ganizational invariants in its structure, specifically a distri-
bution of correlations between the components of the sys-
tem. Operatively, the model is implemented as a ‘Boltz-
mann machine’ neural network reproducing a correlation
structure randomly sampled from a 2D lattice Ising model
at a critical point. Then, we test the model in two classi-
cal examples of learning and control: the Mountain Car and
the double pendulum. In both examples we find that agents
with no free parameters exploit the whole dynamic range of
available configurations being poised near critical transition
points of their parameter space between qualitatively differ-
ent behavioural regimes. Finally, we discuss the possible
applications of this synthetic approach to contribute to the
comprehension of the deeper principles that governs biolog-
ical and cognitive systems.
Organizational invariants of self-organized
criticality
The development of mechanistic models of criticality in bi-
ological systems – based on finding the particular proper-
ties and generative mechanism that give support this regime
of behaviour – typically assumes a particular way of mod-
elling. Typically, we can find models of criticality exploit-
ing clever local rules generating critical behaviour (e.g. Bak
et al., 1987; Bak and Sneppen, 1993), parameter tuning of
systems showing critical phase transitions (e.g. Beggs and
Plenz, 2003; Kitzbichler et al., 2009) and/or the use of spe-
cific structural properties of the underlying network of the
system (e.g. Rubinov et al., 2011; Haimovici et al., 2013).
However, as we have pointed out above, families of criti-
cal phenomena can be classified into universality classes de-
termined only by a few properties of the system. One of
these properties is that all the critical exponents of all mod-
els within a given universality class are exactly the same.
For example, in all Ising models in 2D lattices (square, trian-
gular, hexagonal and so forth) spin-spin correlations follow
the asymptotic form c(r) ∝ 1/rη , where η = 1/4 (Salinas,
2001). This surprising property provides a perspective about
criticality in terms of universal relations, suggesting that we
could model criticality using simple and non-specific mech-
anisms independently on the topology of the system.
Following this intuition, we propose a model not com-
mitted to a particular local behavioural rule or connectivity
topologies. Instead, our model is built on the maintenance of
an organizational structure for reproducing the global func-
tional properties of a family of critical models. There ex-
ists some experimental evidence showing that, given a Ising
model near a critical point, one could build a family of mod-
els by learning correlations drawn at random from the origi-
nal model, which will be poised near a similar critical point
(Tkacik et al., 2009). Based on this inspiration, we propose
to reproduce and support criticality by the invariant mainte-
nance of an organizational structure of correlations follow-
ing a 1/rη law. Thus, instead of restricting a model to a par-
ticular set of mechanisms, we find a general organizational
distribution which could be easily implemented by very dif-
ferent structures, driving a system to a regime of criticality.
We define our model as a neural network as an Ising
model or Boltzmann Machine (Ackley et al., 1985) follow-
ing a maximum entropy distribution:
P (s) =
1
Z
exp
[
β
∑
i
hisi +
∑
i<j
Jijsisj
]
(1)
where the distribution follows a en exponential family
P (s) = 1Z e
−βE(s), Z is a normalization value, where the
energy E(s) of each state is defined in terms of the bias hi
and couplings Jij between pairs of units, and β = 1/(TkB),
being kB Boltzmann’s constant and T the temperature of the
system. Units si can take discrete values of +1 or −1 and
the couplings and bias can take continuous values. Without
loss of generality we can set an operating working temper-
ature such that β = 1. To simulate the network, we use
Glauber dynamics, by which the value of a unit is inverted
each time with probability:
Pi(s) =
[
1 + eβ∆Ei(s)
]−1
(2)
where ∆Ei(s) = 2(hisi +
∑
j Jijsisj) is the energy dif-
ference between the inverted and original state. Throughout
the paper, we simulate the network updating its state sequen-
tially by applying Glauber dynamics to all units in the net-
work in a random order at each simulation step.
In order to induce criticality in its behaviour, our model
maintains a specific internal structure of correlations, con-
serving the statistical properties of a system that we know
it is at criticality. Since the size of our models will be far
from the thermodynamic limit, instead of directly using the
asymptotic form c(r) ∝ 1/rη , we approximate it by com-
puting the correlation structure of a known model showing
this distribution in the thermodynamic limit. One of the few
specific cases where the Ising model presents an exact solu-
tion is a model with zero fields and 2D lattice connectivity, in
which a critical point appears at J = βlog(1 +
√
2)/2 (On-
sager, 1944). Specifically, we use a 20x20 2D lattice Ising
model at critical temperature with periodic boundary con-
ditions. We simulate the model using Glauber Dynamics,
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Figure 1: (A) Distribution of correlation values used for
learning, extracted from a 20x20 lattice Ising model at crit-
ical temperature. (B) Divergence of the heat capacity in 10
models learning random correlations sampled from Figure
1.A. Maximum and minimum values are shown by the grey
area. (C) Distribution of the coupling matrix of a 8x8 lattice
Ising model with periodic boundaries. (D) Distribution of
a 64 units Ising model learning correlations sampled from
Figure 1.A. The order of the nodes in the coupling matrix
has been rearranged using hierarchical clustering.
generating 106 samples, after initializing the model running
105 updates. From this simulation, we obtain the distribu-
tion of correlations in the system cij = 〈sisj〉 observed in
Figure 1.A. Since the fields at all units are zero, the means
mi = 〈si〉 of all units are also zero.
Once obtained a distribution of correlations, we will gen-
erate new models by assigning to each unit and pair of units
means and correlations randomly drawn at random from the
distribution of the 20x20 Ising model. At this point, the
problem is that it is not trivial finding which combination of
hi and Jij generates a specific combination of mj and cij .
This is known as the ‘inverse Ising problem’. This problem
was formulated by Ackley et al. (1985) in their discussion of
Boltzmann machines and can be solved by a simple gradient
descent rule:
hi ← hi + µ(mi −mmi )
Jji ← Jji + µ(cij − cmij )
(3)
where µ is a constant learning rate, mi and cij are the ob-
jective mean and correlations of the learning algorithm, and
mmi and c
m
ij are the mean and correlations of the model for
the current values of hi and Jij . Computing each learn step
is computationally costly, since it requires to sum over all
possible states of s, although approximate methods as Monte
Carlo sampling are generally used to speed up learning. As a
demonstration, we apply the learning rule to different mod-
els assigning them objective means and correlations drawn
at random from the distribution found for the 20x20 lat-
tice Ising model. For each model, we apply Equation 3 for
learning mi and cij , computing the actual mmi and c
m
ij with
Glauber dynamics. Since precision of learning is not impor-
tant (the objective is to capture the overall distribution) we
do not wait for convergence of the algorithm and simply up-
date the learning rule 1000 times. We used a learning rate
µ = 0.01 and computed 1000N samples for each learning
step, being N the size of the system.
Using this method, we apply the learning rule to 10 dif-
ferent models for sizes N = 4, 8, 16, 32, 64. For each
model, we test if the models are at criticality by comput-
ing their heat capacityC(β) = β2〈E2(s)〉−〈E(s)〉2, where
E(s) = −∑i hisi−∑i<j Jijsisj is the energy of the Ising
model. The divergence of the heat capacity is an indicator of
criticality. We simulate each model for 105 steps for differ-
ent values of β, and we found that all the 10 models diverge
at the operating temperature of β = 1 (Figure 1.B), showing
similar values of heat capacity to the original lattice Ising
model with periodic boundaries. Nevertheless, although the
distribution of correlations is similar than the lattice Ising
model, the structure of the model is radically changed. In-
stead of the original ordered structure of a uniform lattice
(Figure 1.C), we have now a disordered distribution of cou-
plings Jij (Figure 1.D), including both positive and nega-
tive couplings. Also, each random selection of correlations
yields a completely different arrangement of values of cou-
plings Jij .
In the following section, we use this learning rule to drive
the neural controller of an embodied agent towards a critical
point. In order to do so, we need to take into account the
environment during learning. If we consider two intercon-
nected Ising models, (one being the neural controller and
other being the environment) Equation 3 holds perfectly if
we only apply it to the values of i and j corresponding to
units of the neural controller. In our case, we will not use an
Ising model as an environment but instead we will use two
classical examples from reinforced learning. Therefore, our
learning rule will be valid as long as the statistics of the envi-
ronment can be approximated by an Ising model with an ar-
bitrary number of units. Luckily, Ising models are universal
approximators (Montu´far, 2014) and any arbitrary environ-
ment could be approximated by an equivalent Ising model.
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Figure 2: (A) Structure of the embodied neural controller.
(B) Mountain Car environment: an under-powered car that
must drive up a steep hill by balancing itself to gain momen-
tum. (C) Acrobot environment: an agent has to balance a
double pendulum to reach the high part of the environment.
Embodied model: Mountain Car and double
pendulum
In order to evaluate the behaviour of the proposed learning
model, we test it in two embodied situations using the Ope-
nAI Gym toolkit (Brockman et al., 2016). For doing so we
define a neural network consisting on an Ising model de-
fined as in Equation 1, describing a network of 8 units, with
6 hidden units and 2 motor units, and a variable number of
sensor units (4 or 6, depending on the environment). Mo-
tor units will define the actions performed by the agents,
while sensor units are updated directly from the state of the
environment. Sensor units and motor units are only con-
nected to hidden neurons, while hidden neurons are fully
connected to the rest of the system (Figure 2.A). All con-
nections are assigned an objective cij value (selected at ran-
dom from distribution P (cij) at Figure 1.A), and all units
except sensor units are assigned an objective mean value of
mi = 0. During learning, the agent will apply the rule in
Equation 3 for adjusting its means and correlations to the
objective values. At each simulation step, the Ising model
is simulated by updating its units in uniform random or-
der using Glauber dynamics. The first embodiment of the
network consists in the Mountain Car environment (Moore,
1990). This environment is a classical testbed in reinforce-
ment learning depicting an under-powered car that must
drive up a steep hill (Figure 2.B). Since gravity is stronger
than the car’s engine, the vehicle must learn to leverage po-
tential energy by driving to the opposite hill before the car
is able to make it to the goal at the top of the rightmost
hill. In this environment, the horizontal position x of the
car is limited to an interval of [−1.5pi, 0.5pi], and the ver-
tical position of the car is defined as y = sin(3x). The
velocity in the horizontal axis is updated each time step as
v(t+ 1) = v(t) + 0.001a− 0.0025 cos(3x), where a is the
action of the motor which can be either −1, 0, 1. The sen-
sors of the neural network are defined as an array of four
units, which are fed the instantaneous velocity of the car,
discretized into an array of 4 bits. Each sensor unit is as-
signed a value of 1 if its corresponding bit is active and −1
otherwise.
The second embodiment consists in a double pendulum or
‘Acrobot’ (Sutton, 1996) which has to coordinate the move-
ments of two connected links to lift its weight (Figure 2.C).
The position of the system is defined by the angles of both
pendulums θ1 and θ2, whose behaviour is defined by the fol-
lowing system of differential equations:
θ¨1 = −(d2θ¨2 + φ1)/d1
θ¨2 = (m2l
2
c2 + I2 −
d22
d1
)−1(τ +
d2
d1
φ1 − φ2)
d1 = m1l
2
c1 +m2(l
2
1 + l
2
c2+
+2l1lc2 cos(θ2)) + I1 + I2
d2 = m2(l
2
c2 + l1lc2 cos(theta2)) + I2
φ2 = m2lc2g cos(θ1 + θ2 − pi/2)
φ1 = −m2l1lc2θ˙22 sin(θ2)−
−2m2l1lc2θ˙2θ˙1 sin(θ2)+
+(m1lc1 +m2l1)g cos(θ1 − pi/2) + φ2
(4)
where τ is the torque applied to the system which can be
either−1, 0, 1, m1 = m2 = m is the mass of the links, l1 =
l2 = 1 is the length of the links and lc1 = lc2 = 0.5 are the
lengths to the center of mass of the links, and I1 = I2 = 1
are the moments of inertia of the links and g = 9.8 is the
gravity.
The Acrobot embodiment was defined with 6 sensor units,
divided in two groups of 3. Each group encoded the bi-
narized horizontal and vertical positions of the tip of the
second link, defined as x = sin(θ1) + sin(θ1 + θ2), y =
− cos(θ1)− cos(θ1 + θ2).
In order to make the tasks challenging, we set the maxi-
mum velocity allowed to the Mountain car to ±0.045 (typ-
ically is set to 0.07) and the mass of the Acrobot links to
m = 1.75 (typically m = 1). These parameters are de-
signed to make it difficult for agents controlled by neural
networks with random parameters solve the task (reaching
the top of the environment), having success rates of 11.2%
for the Mountain Car and 7.7% for the Acrobot1.
We train 10 agents for each embodiment applying the
learning rule from Equation 3, with η = 0.01. In or-
der to avoid overfitting, we add an L2 regularization term
λ = 0.004. Note that agents during learning have no explicit
goal other than adjusting the correlations of the system to a
random sample extracted from the probability distribution
in Figure 1.A. Agents are initialized in the starting random
positions in the bottom of their environments (x ∈ [0.4, 0.6]
for the Mountain Car and θ1, θ2, θ˙1, θ˙2 ∈ [−0.1, 01] for the
Acrobot). The state of the neural network is randomized and
the initial parameters hi and Jij are set to zero. Agents are
simulated for 1000 trials of 5000 steps, computing each trial
the values ofmmi and c
m
ij and applying Equation 3 at the end
of the trial . Note that agents are not reset at the end of the
trial.
Results
In this section, we analyze the behaviour of the neural con-
trollers and the behavioural patterns of the agents respect to
the possibilities of their parameter space. The first striking
result is that all 10 agents present quite similar behaviour for
each embodiment, despite the fact that each one has learned
different values of cij and Jij . In order to compare the
agents with other behavioural possibilities, we explore the
parameter space by changing the parameter β of the agents.
Modifying the value of β is equivalent to a global rescal-
ing of the parameters of the agent transforming hi ← β · hi
and Jij ← β · Jij , thus exploring the parameter space along
one specific direction. For 21 values of β logarithmically
distributed in the interval [10−1, 101] we simulate the 10
agents for each embodiment during 106 simulation steps, af-
ter starting the agents from the random starting position and
an initial run of 104 simulation steps. We will use the results
of those simulations for all the situations in this section.
Signatures of criticality in the neural controller
First, in order to test whether the agents are being driven near
a critical point, we analyze signatures of critical behaviour
in the neural controller of the agent. Counting the occur-
rence of each possible state of all the neurons of the agents
1Success rates were evaluated by simulating 1000 neural con-
trollers with random parameters (sampled from a uniform distri-
bution in the range [−2, 2]). The Mountain Car was simulated for
1000 simulation steps starting from a random position in the valley
between [0.4, 0.6], and was considered successful when reached
the maximum position at least once. The Acrobot was simulated
for 5000 simulation steps from the bottom position (angles and an-
gular speeds between [−0.1, 01]) and was consider successful if
reached a vertical position higher than 1.8.
(including sensor, hidden and motor neurons) we can com-
pute the probability distribution of the Ising model P (s).
We observe that all agents approximately follow a Zipf’s
law at β = 1 for the Mountain Car (Figure 3.A) and Ac-
robot embodiments (Figure 3.B), with error bars in a very
narrow range. The power-law distribution of neural activa-
tion patterns suggests that the neural controller of the agents
is operating near a critical point.
Since the neural network is now connected to an environ-
ment that is driven by deterministic mechanics, the proba-
bility distribution of the Ising neural controller is no longer
described by equation 1. Thus, classical indicators of criti-
cality as the divergence of the heat capacity are not directly
calculable from the energy of the model. However, we can
look for other indicators related to second order phase tran-
sitions, computed from the probability distribution P (s) cal-
culated from simulation. One indicator can be the behaviour
of order parameters such as the entropy of the system, a
transition around the critical temperature. For example, if
we compute the entropy of the probability function of the
neural controller H(s) = −∑x P (x) logP (x) for differ-
ent values of β we observe that the agent is near an order-
disorder transition (Figure 3.C,D) (as well, some Mountain
Car agents present a smaller transition at larger values of β,
showing that interesting behaviours can also arise in the or-
dered phase).
In lattice Ising models, critical points are also indicated
by other measures such as a peak in the mutual information
found in the system (Barnett et al., 2013). Mutual informa-
tion is defined as:
I(x, y) =
∑
x,y
P (x, y) log
P (x, y)
P (x)P (y)
(5)
In our case, we measure the mutual information between the
set of sensor units ss and the set containing the rest of the
neurons of the controller sn. The objective is to capture how
much information of the sensorimotor coordination of the
robot is captured by the system as a whole instead of be-
ing contained in the variables alone. In Figure 3.E,F we can
observe how mutual information between sensors and neu-
rons has a peak very close to β = 1, suggesting that agents
are poised in a point of the parameter space maximizing the
exchange of information between the agent and its environ-
ment.
These results suggest that the agent’s neural controller is
operating near a point of criticality, resembling a second or-
der phase transition. As we will see now, no only the agent’s
neural controller presents indicators of critical activity, but
also the behaviour of the agent as a whole.
Behavioural transitions in the parameter space
What does it imply for the agent to poise its neural controller
at a critical point? It should be remarked here that our agents
are given no explicit goal but they only tend to behavioural
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Figure 3: Signatures of criticality for 10 different agents in
the Mountain Car (left) and Acrobot (right) embodiments.
(A-B) Ranked probability distribution function of the Ising
models. The real distribution is compared with a distribution
following Zipf’s law, (i.e. P (s) = 1/rank, dashed line).
We observe a good agreement between the model and Zipf’s
law, suggesting critical scaling. (C-D) Entropy of the neu-
ral system H(s). A transition is observed near the operat-
ing temperature. (E-F) Mutual information between sensors
and neurons I(ss; sn). In all figures the mean of all agents
is shown as a solid line, while the region between maxi-
mum and minimum values showed by the different agents
is shown as a grey area.
patterns maintaining a distribution of correlations randomly
sampled from the distribution in Figure 1.A. Thus, we ex-
plore the effects of transiting the critical point of the neural
controller observing the different behavioural modes of the
agent in the parameter space by changing the value of β. The
behaviour of the car can be described just by the position x
and speed v at different moments of time. As well, the posi-
tion of the tip of the Acrobot’s links shows a good image of
the system’s behaviour.
In Figure 4.A-C we can observe the behaviour of the
Mountain Car for β = {0.5, 1, 2} respectively. We observe
that for values of β lower than the operating temperature, the
agents are not able to reach the top of the mountain. On the
other hand, when β is higher, the agents present more ‘rigid’
trajectories going form one top of the mountain to the other.
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Figure 4: Transition in the behavioural regime of the agents.
We show the behaviour of two agents with different values
of β for the Mountain Car (A, B, C) and Acrobot (D, E, F)
embodiments. We observe that β = 1 is a transition point
between two modes of behaviour in both agents.
At β = 1 the agent is able to reach the top of the mountain
(note that the peaks of the mountain are located at x = −pi/2
and x = pi/6) while displaying larger behavioural diversity.
Similarly, in Figure 4.D-F, we observe that the Acrobot at
β = 1 displays a diverse range of behaviours, being able to
reach to the top of the plane while, when β is lowered or in-
creased, it drifts to other behavioural modes in less diverse
regimes. Furthermore, if we compute the median value of
height y˜ for both agents at different values of β (Figures 5),
we observe that there is a transition in the parameter space
around β = 1, in which both agents maximize the diversity
of positions reached in their environment. This suggests that
there is a behavioural transition connected with the phase
transition of the neural Ising controller, in which the agent
maximizes the dynamic range of inputs of the neural con-
troller.
Discussion
Recapitulating the main ideas presented so far, we have
tested how taking a set of correlations chosen at random
from a distribution generated by a lattice Ising model at a
critical point, we can construct a new model that is also near
a critical point of its parameter space. Moreover, impos-
ing an embodied agent to maintain these correlations using
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Figure 5: Behavioural transitions in the (A) Mountain Car
and (B) Acrobot environments, showing the median height
y˜ of the agent, together with the 5% and 95% percentiles
in the Mountain Car and the 5% and the 95% and 99.9%
percentiles in the Acrobot (dotted lines).
a simple learning rule – as a sort of organizational home-
ostasis – drives the agent to a critical point, which coincides
with behavioural transitions of its parameter space. This
suggests the possibility that criticality could be diagnosed
and even induced directly from the maintenance of a given
distribution of correlations rather than modelling a precise
mechanistic structure. Also, criticality could be caused by
quite simple mechanisms only relying on local information,
maintaining specific correlations around a given value. Here
we have implemented the mechanism as a simple Boltzmann
Learning process, but other rules could have the same effect,
as the combination of Hebbian and anti-Hebbian tendencies
in specific ratios.
In our model, we only require the system to maintain a
distribution of relations between the components of the sys-
tem. This connects with systemic approaches to biology in-
terested not in specific or intrinsic components of biolog-
ical systems but in the networks of relations and processes
(Bernard and Greene, 1957; Rosen, 1972; Ashby, 1962), and
it is also in line with notions of relational invariance as Pi-
aget’s approach on functional invariants in cognitive devel-
opment (Piaget, 1971) or Maturana and Varela’s ideas of
autopoietic machines, defined as homeostatic systems that
maintain constant its own organization as a network of rela-
tions between components (Maturana and Varela, 1980).
Assuming a similar systemic perspective, we have derived
learning rules for a system that drives itself near a critical
point by maintaining an invariant structure of correlations
roughly defined by a critical exponent 1/rη . This promotes
a different perspective on criticality. In our model, the dis-
tribution of correlations is not the consequence of criticality
in a specific topology, but the cause driving an indetermi-
nate topology to a critical point. The question now could be
whether imposing connections derived from a 1/rη function
is a strong assumption or implies particularly exigent cir-
cumstances. We do not think so, since power law functions
can be naturally generated by simple rules of preferential at-
tachment favouring ‘rich-get-richer’ cumulative inequalities
(Greenwood and Yule, 1920), or directly as a natural con-
sequence of certain geometries of space (as e.g. gravitation
laws, see Barrow, 2002).
In this way, our model only assumes that a system is go-
ing to adapt to preserve an internal network of relations.
It emphasizes the maintenance of organizational structures
capable of reproducing living systems behaviors being in
opposition with the ones relying on internal models of the
external source of sensory input. Thus, this contrasts with
other approaches which have focused in understanding crit-
icality as a strategy to effectively represent a complex and
variable external world, for example discovering criticality
in predictive coding or deep learning architectures dealing
with complex inputs (Friston et al., 2012; Lin and Tegmark,
2016; Hidalgo et al., 2014). In those cases, an internalist
view is assumed, where the neural controller is representing
structures of the external world, whose complexity may be
the cause of criticality being present in the neural controller.
Instead, our approach is agnostic about what are the inputs
or the external world of an organism, and deals only with
how an agent rearranges its internal structures facing differ-
ent environments.
The agents presented here are not specifically designed
for a particular problem. In simple terms, our agents gen-
erate (preserving the same internal neural organization) a
wide variability and richness of behaviours (avoiding both
disorder and explosive and indiscriminate propagation) that
permits to explore the space of parameters and eventually to
achieve solutions of problems for which it was not designed.
The empirical evidence of experiments shown here supports
this idea. A parallel could be established with the concept of
play, which can be understood as a ‘rule-breaker’ activity of
the constraints of stable and self-equilibrating regime of be-
haviours, that is not directly required from the environment
and without concrete goals (Di Paolo et al., 2010). A model
as the one presented here could be used for exploring life-
like autonomous behaviour without the need of explicit in-
ternal representations, goals, or rule-based behaviour. Con-
ceptual models of critical activity based in the maintenance
of a system’s relational invariants could help developing a
synthetic route towards the exploration of adaptive and em-
bodied criticality.
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